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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3842 
___________ 
 
DARIN JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COUNTY JAIL C.F.C.F.; SUPERINTENDENT OF C.F.C.F.;  
MEDICAL SUPERVISOR 11pm-7am 2/18/13;  
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS on A-1-1 Unit 11pm-7am 2/18/13 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-02366) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joel M. Slomsky 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 2, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 30, 2015) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Darin Jones, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District 
Court’s order dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).   
 Jones claimed a violation of his Eighth Amendment right, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, and common law negligence against various officers and a medical supervisor at 
Curran-Frumhold Correctional Facility (“CFCF”) in Philadelphia, stemming from 
injuries he sustained falling from the top bunk of his cell.  According to the complaint, 
Jones’s cell did not have a ladder or step so that he could safely climb to the top bunk.  
As a result thereof, while trying to climb down from his bunk, Jones fell, hitting his head 
and knocking himself unconscious.  Jones was evaluated by the medical staff and 
administered pain killers and an ice pack.  Thereafter, Jones was discharged and escorted 
back to his cell. The next day, Jones was transferred from CFCF to the State Correctional 
Institute in Graterford, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Graterford”).1  There, Jones again received a 
medical exam, after which his wrist was x-rayed and he was again prescribed pain 
medication.  Jones alleged that “he continues to suffer from constant headaches and 
extreme and sometimes sever[e] pain in his left wrist,” which did not exist prior to his 
fall.  The District Court dismissed Jones’s complaint because it failed to allege facts 
evidencing a constitutional violation.  Jones now appeals the dismissal of his complaint.  
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the federal claims.  Lake 
v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).  We must “accept as true 
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the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from them.”  Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).  We may summarily affirm 
the decision of the District Court if no substantial question is presented on appeal.  See 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
 We agree with the District Court that Jones’s complaint does not state a claim 
because he fails to allege facts sufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation.   
 To plead an Eighth Amendment claim based on conditions-of-confinement, Jones 
must show that he was subjected to a sufficiently serious deprivation that resulted in the 
denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and that officials at CFCF 
were “deliberately indifferent” to Jones’s safety.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 
(1994); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1983) (“To be cruel and unusual 
punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than 
ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.”)  Similarly, to plead an 
Eighth Amendment claim based on insufficient medical care, Jones must demonstrate 
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.  Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also White v. Napolean, 897 F.2d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 
1990) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103) (“Only ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain’ or ‘deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs’ of prisoners are sufficiently 
egregious to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”).  Eighth Amendment liability 
cannot be based on simple negligence or lack of due care.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-37; 
                                                                                                                                                  
1 Jones does not name SCI-Graterford or any official at the institution in his complaint. 
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see also Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is well-settled that 
claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, 
do not constitute ‘deliberate indifference.’”).  Here, the allegations contained in the 
complaint, taken as true, fail to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent 
to the conditions of Jones’s cell or to his health, after his fall.  On the contrary, Jones 
alleged that he received immediate medical attention after the fall and was given both 
medication and an ice pack to treat his injuries.2  Moreover, Jones did not allege that he 
ever complained of or let officials at CFCF know that he was having difficulty climbing 
to and from the top bunk.  At its most generous reading, Jones’s complaint alleged mere 
negligence, and not deliberate indifference, in CFCF’s failure to provide a step-ladder 
and in its treatment of Jones’s injuries following the fall.  And negligence is insufficient 
to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.  Accordingly, the District Court properly 
dismissed Jones’s Eighth Amendment claim. 
 While the District Court gives no explicit explanation for its dismissal of Jones’s 
common law negligence claim, we interpret the dismissal as the District Court’s 
declination to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); United Mine 
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).  As we conclude that the District Court 
properly dismissed the federal claims, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the District 
                                              
2 Jones allegations relating to his treatment at SCI-Graterford are not relevant to his 
complaint, as Jones does not name either SCI-Graterford or any official at SCI-Graterford 
as a party to this complaint.    
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Court’s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the state negligence claim.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 
1999).  Finally, District Courts are required to grant leave to amend complaints unless 
such amendment would be futile.  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 
(3d Cir. 2002).  For the reasons set forth above, any amendment would have been futile. 
 For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that the appeal presents no substantial 
question.  We will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court, and deny as moot 
Jones’s motion for appointment of counsel.   
